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Introductory Remarks: the Jewish People does not Dream 
This paper takes up an argument advanced by Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-
Luc Nancy to the effect that “the Jewish people does not dream.”2 Coming from two non-
Jewish philosophers and immediately implying a psychological intuition, we would be 
justified in wondering what such a claim could possibly mean. Is not much of Jewish 
literature, from the miraculous feats of the Marahal of Prague to the Bal Shem Tov, a 
literature of dreams? Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy would likely acknowledge this; however, 
they are working at a different level. They are examining a characteristic of Jewish religious 
life from the point of view of the creation of a “we” and the implications it has for the life 
and psyche of the Jewish person. Thus, if dreaming and phantasy exemplify what 
psychoanalysis called “identification”— an individual and social phenomenon ingredient in 
the formation of the self, and one that bedeviled Freud as he traced its origins in culture—
and if the first identification requires a true “other” (that Freud identified with the Father),3 
then the argument follows that Jews do not “dream.” That is, they do not dream–identify, 
because the “Father” with whom they would identify is unfigurable.  
[W]e understand this expression on two levels: 1. This people does not 
identify with the Father in the oneiric mode, or in the mode of an immediate 
adhesion to the figure (or phantasm, or phantom) of the Father. 
[Nevertheless], if it is the people and the religion of the Father, then [this 
must be] in an other sense, call it as “vigil” and as “vigilant”.  2. This people—
or its “analysis”—escapes the royal road of psychoanalysis (i.e. that of 
dreams) up to a certain point. It requires, as Freud’s Moses put it, importing 
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(Eintragung) the concept of the unconscious into collective psychology and, 
consequently, a re-thinking of that concept (PJNRP, 194; 59).4 
 
I propose to explore the meaning of identification in light of foundation myths and 
with regard to what could be called the Jewish innovation, i.e., the foreclosure on 
representation. Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy understand “foreclosure” informally, as an act 
of symbolic exclusion. Unlike Lacan’s famous forclusion, they do not insist that what is shut 
out never reaches consciousness.5 Instead, they emphasize that foreclosure reorganizes what 
is imaginable for a given community and that this in turn influences both ritual and memory. 
Moreover, the foreclosure of representation has surprising effects on the way we envision 
our identity, as I will show by reading Martin Buber on Genesis 3 (the tree of knowledge).6 
Throughout, I will be comparing Buber’s reading with Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy’s 
arguments concerning mythic identifications. As a part of their larger project, which rethinks 
the unconscious as affectivity independently of positive or formal representations, Lacoue-
Labarthe and Nancy explore the conjoined origins of psychic and social structures in their 
work L’inconscient est destructuré comme un affect [The Unconscious is de-structured like an 
Affect]. 
Why would a culture foreclose identifications? What is it about religious life that 
engages identification in ways potentially dangerous to individuals and the community itself? 
Freud argued that proto-laws like taboos mirror psychic functions like foreclosures, whether 
these bear on representations, bodies or on symbolic territories. 7 As Lévi-Strauss discovered, 
what holds these exclusions together under a common concept is that they operate like the 
taboo on incest. That is, a negative normativity always goes together with a positive 
“performativity”. Negatively, the so-called foreclosure of representation prevents 
identification with “fathers” understood as powers personified in oneiric images or ritual 
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practices entailing ecstatic fusion.8 Of course, such identifications extend from cults of the 
ancestors to animism, and hero-god myths. At the aesthetic level, it is clearly present in art 
and poetry.  
Paradoxically, foreclosures on representation may actually motivate attempts at 
alternate forms of representation.9 That is, in response to the pressure of foreclosure, 
alternative representations may actually escape mimetic gestures, such as those that imitate or 
incarnate the “ancestor” or the “god”, etc. These would then be situated at a different level, 
that of metaphors or laws (cf. Exodus 3: 4-6 since, arguably, in the impossibility of imitation 
of the God, something like his law or his teaching becomes the central existential concern). 
There would thus be mimetic and differential representations. The latter does the work of 
what Jacques Derrida called the “trace” and I am here calling “differential representation” 
those narrative operations by which a trace (recounted or drawn) opens up any metaphoric 
“surface” on which it is set, by introducing a simple difference (Genesis 1: 4-7). Once 
introduced, this difference alters the surface or the narrative context, and with it the subject 
perceiving it understands that the context and the “author” of the trace cannot be reduced to 
each other.10 As we will see, the foreclosure on dreaming, explored by Lacoue-Labarthe and 
Nancy, is wonderfully illustrated by Buber’s reading of Genesis 3, wherein eating the fruit of 
the Tree of Knowledge of good and evil—and with it Adam and Eve’s expulsion from the 
Garden—exemplifies both the foreclosure of identification and the introduction of a 
differentiating trace. Buber’s reading bears out Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy’s claim that the 
Jewish innovation was to introduce a hermeneutic doubling (with the voice of the narrator 
and its occasional irony, for example)into the narratives of its myths, creating a religion 
largely devoid of ancestor cults, animism, ecstatic fusion, and semi-divine heroes (OB, 15; 
BGB 611).  
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Viewed from without, Judaism—almost an anti-religion—forecloses identification 
with fathers in the mode of phantasy, which is his primary mode. This means that, in the 
culture and thinking structured by the Torah and the Talmud, a limit inaugurates a self-
conscious human dimension. The limit separates humanity as a whole from divinity, despite 
eventual communication, trials or gifts. Moreover, this limit, sketched clearly in the myth of 
the Garden, establishes mortality—as de facto death and as separation from God at the heart 
of Judaism as its symbolic institution of the community.  
While this limit may not be unique to Jewish monotheism, it runs through the 
rabbinic reception of the Torah. Some historical interpretations have argued that this 
separation made Jewish cultural and religious survival possible.11 Be that as it may, the limit 
breaks with religions (whether polytheistic or henotheistic) in which gods are conceived on a 
human model, where ancestors influence community decisions, and humans accede to 
divinity by rites, deeds, or upon the death of heroes. In the Jewish beginning, then, is a limit. 
The limit sets the activity of separation in motion and opens to an ordered creation of new 
combinations, like a cultural geometry. In many biblical narratives, we are clearly confronted 
with practical and conceptual limits on phantasied identifications of different sorts, the same 
identifications by which Greek tragedy conceived the incipience of the human political 
community out of human sacrifices that restored peace between the gods and humans, or by 
concluding the struggle between heroes and Anankè or necessity, natural or divine. From the 
Judaic limit arose a sociality and a politics of a different sort. It was structured neither by 
mythic nor totemic social identifications. More importantly, it escaped problems arising from 
conflicting paternal identifications.12 
Buber’s Biblical Humanism 
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In contrast to “Greek humanism,” Martin Buber defined the rebirth of the Jewish 
community textually, as a “Biblical humanism” (1933, 1941).13 This rebirth is expressed in a 
tone redolent of Nietzsche (whom Buber read carefully), as “the rebirth of its normative 
primal forces.” These forces are located in the capacity to hear the paradoxical word of the 
Jewish Bible, which is paradoxical because it encompasses universality (as the possibility of 
identification for the nations) and particularity (which draws on the resources sustained by 
the separation and the religious-cultural wealth of historic enactment through ritual). What 
Buber called the “paradoxical word” is at once transcription, trace, and voice; a speaking-to 
that is always repetition, which is why one midrash argues the Torah had to exist prior the 
creation of the world. Biblical humanism is for Buber a calling for Jews. But while Greek 
humanism has roots in religious and mythical thought, Jewish humanism introduces the 
additional foreclosure of a transcendence based on the “immediate adhesion to the figure” 
or representational image of a great Other. This anti-fetishistic strategy makes it appear as if 
anti-religious.  
Buber illustrates what it means to hear the paradoxical word in his reading of 
Genesis 3 in an essay entitled “The Tree of Knowledge” dating from 1953 (OB, 14-21; 
BGB, 610-617). There, he rethinks what he called “life forces” in the 1930’s but in an 
exegetical context. In the Garden narrative of Genesis 3, the original force that is the will-to-
know finds itself definitively limited without in turn engendering reactive forces. Alert to its 
predictable ability to expand, Buber calls the will-to-know a “human demonism.”14 The great 
challenge is to disable that will without disabling a love of knowledge or engendering new 
forces in a reactive will (be that of humans or of Yahweh). 
For Buber, the core intuition of the Garden narrative lies in thinking mortality prior 
to sexuality.15 The “Tree of Knowledge” stages the meaning of the will-to-know for a finite, 
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created being. Even in our Garden humans, this will-to-know aims at omniscience, a crucial 
aspect of our will-to-power. Without urging that we disabuse ourselves of the idea of truth 
as monolithic, Buber recalls that for created beings, “truth” in its highest instantiation is 
knowledge of the opposed poles of the world’s being. Although translations of the Bible 
have expressed this as “knowledge of good and evil,” we should initially avoid reading 
normativity into this. For Buber, omniscience means knowledge of worldly binaries like 
fullness and lack, hope and despair, fusion and dissociation—those mobile elements that 
form the grammar of myths and a frame for cultural identities. 
Buber unfolds his conception of finite truth on the premise that human experience is 
disjunctive. Forces we unleash, and forces that act upon us, can set us into a position of 
“yes-saying” or into one of “no-saying”, whereby we are either open to transcendence-in-
separation or distance ourselves from it: “Namely the immutable difference and distance that 
exists between God and man, irrespective of the primal fact of the latter’s ‘likeness’ to God” 
(BGB, 613; OB, 18). Buber is not interested in the question of the ontology of sin, or in “the 
fall of man.” Yes-saying “can present itself to the experience and perception of man, while 
[he is] in the no-position.” This would mean to feel and to know oneself separated from the 
good or from God. But “not [so,] the no in the yes-position” (BGB, 614; OB, 19). Humans 
realize this “when [man] recognizes a condition in which he finds himself whenever he has 
transgressed the command of God, as the “evil” and the one he has thereby lost and 
which…is inaccessible to him, as the good” (BGB, 614; OB, 19). The so-called no and the 
yes positions are existential and moral, individual and collective. In themselves, they are not 
exclusive to Judaism. 
Knowledge of and movement between the two positions may be historical states, but 
they are preeminently existential and sapiential, as illustrated by the narrative of Adam and 
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Eve. Following their expulsion from the Garden, the narrative continues unfolding, only 
now, as “a process in the world,” in human existence (BGB, 614; OB, 19):  
…at this point, the process in the human soul becomes a process in the 
world. Through the knowledge of oppositeness [Erkennen der 
Gegensätzlichkeit], the opposites which are always latently present in creation 
break out into actual reality; they become existent…. [The] first humans, as 
soon as they have eaten of the fruit, ‘know’ that they are naked…they feel 
the natural state of unclothedness in which they find themselves to be an ill 
or an evil…and by this very feeling, they make it so… (BGB, 614; OB, 19, 
trans. mod.) 
 
The “knowledge” Adam and Eve gained about the binaries that structure existence, 
understood as processual, is a human knowledge determined by finite time and space, and 
shaped by the actions we take in regard to our value judgments. In God, Buber argues, these 
opposites stand together, which shows us their ontological status in light of the divine: “He 
encompasses them, as He is absolutely superior to them; He has direct intercourse with 
them [er geht mit ihnen unmittelbar um]” (BGB, 614; OB, 18). This is because so-called 
“God” is not a being in the sense of a creation; perhaps not a being at all. There is no 
purposive unfolding or “becoming” in Buber’s reading of the Other here, though it is 
possible to speculate about a dialectic of forces in creation. 
Humans are the agents and sites of this dialectic of created being. 
The decisive separation between humans and God lies in the mode by which the opposed 
forces and positions in existence comes into view. For Buber, when the narrator of Genesis 
3 has God say that man “is become as one of us, to know good and evil” (OB, 20), the 
narrator ironizes that man now knows existence as such, yet, because he is finite, cannot help 
but unleash a dynamic of new reactive forces (“in dieser kläglichen Wirkung der großen 
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Magie des Wie-Gott-Werdens wird die Ironie des Erzählers augenscheinlich” (BGB, 615)). 
This knowledge is not creative, because it is the knowledge of a finite creature situated in 
space and time; the language “become as one of us” combines irony with a rueful 
compassion.16 For, the ambitious creature could not grasp its new “unlike-likeness,” any 
more than it could hold fast to the “yes” and the “no” positions at the same time. This 
“unlike-likeness” expresses a hiatus between the creator and the created, finitude and 
infinity. In the Garden narrative lies the discovery of the meaning of finitude, the human 
historical condition that admits only unlike repetitions, fabulation, and myths of identity. What 
it cannot do is to leap over the hiatus. 
Cyclical and linear according to its modes, mortality engages humans in a history and 
a care for the succession of generations. The fact of mortality—and notably the fact that 
Adam and Eve are expelled from the Garden before they can eat from the Tree of Life 
(Genesis 3:22)—argues that it is a good thing for a creature in pursuit of omniscience to 
remain mortal, since nothing else can stop it from willing to leap over its limitations.  
Humans thus ate from only one of the two trees in the Garden. Adam and Eve were 
driven out before they could consume the fruit of the Tree of Life; for, a finite creature that 
eats its way to eternal life is demonry, Buber argues. “Demonry” expresses the idea of a 
being that could live out its conatus and drives eternally, remaining in the no-position, denying 
its lack of control over its birth and death, and never able to hold together the opposed 
forces unleashed, in mortal terms, by will to power.  
According to this logic, while human mortality is tragic (notably in the form of the 
death of the other, as Levinas has observed), it is also redemptive through human history, 
and there are things to do on Earth, from building society to deepening our understanding 
of the Law. Hence, the gentle irony of the expulsion from Eden:. “For [man], as the being 
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driven round amid opposites, [death] may become a haven, the knowledge of which brings 
comfort,” writes Buber (BGB, 616; OB, 21).  
This stern benefaction is preceded by the passing of sentence [the 
announcement of tragedy is inscribed in the act of justice]. It announces no 
radical alteration of that which already exists; it is only that all things are 
drawn into the atmosphere of [mortal] oppositeness [die Atmosphäre der 
Gegensätzlichkeit]….From the seat [Sitz], which had been made ready for 
him, man is sent out upon a path [Weg], his own…into the world’s history… 
(BGB, 617; OB, 21) 
 
In the transmutation of humans’ status from static to dynamic, death becomes the 
source of time’s value and inaugurates the reckoning of a hitherto absurd notion called 
“history”. No thinking, philosophical or religious, that fails to address death as limit and 
institution, can grasp, in a way that is free from phantasmatic identification (with God or the 
immortals), the significance of human sociality, and the necessity of a pragmatic limitation of 
the drives.17 We might say that, for the Greeks too, the political problem par excellence was 
that of limiting the coalescence of disparate drives within a group or within a tyrant. Plato’s 
mythic body of the tyrannical ruler (Republic, 588c-589a), with its multiple heads, replays the 
difficulty of limiting drives and their inevitable conflict in the absence of the foreclosure of 
mythic identifications, whether through philosophy or through a symbolic injunction 
(Genesis 3: 24). After all, the multiple heads represent the different avatars of the tyrant for 
different groups, all of which must be held in thrall to the sole figure of the tyrant. However, 
lacking the limitation on identifications, the tyrant finds himself in contradiction with 
himself, and the momentary stasis he achieves dissolves into warring factions. Of course, the 
limitation has to be flexible enough to avoid a complete divorce between the life energies 
carried by those so-called drives and their beneficial sublimations.  
 10 
 Buber argues that the sources of Genesis 3 come from other religions—including the 
Avestic stories of the jealousy of the gods. But Genesis 3’s innovation becomes obvious 
within the logic of monotheism: How could the one God be jealous of his creation, when 
that God is not conceived on the model of mortal humanity? This God thus would escape 
human understanding, arising as it does in the movement of textual inscription (as the trace 
that produces differences) and later, in the sociality deployed through the expulsion into 
history. A further dimension of sociality is unfolded in the prophetic call to justice in the 
name of God. By contrast, anthropomorphic conceptions of gods entail human-like 
responses on their part (jealousy, anger, repentance). But this modeling of identification—
wherein the gods look and act like us, send our contemplation back to us and thereby 
celebrate a collective self-sacralization that vitiates the existential limits set by our death and 
that of the other person. If there is no “knowledge” either of death or of the other as such, 
then the endless repetition of rebirths, ancestor or totemic worship, and anthropomorphic 
divinities suggests that this limit called death is not so serious. Life is reborn out of life, 
cyclically; through the hero or the semi-divine figures, humans pass between “here below” 
and the heavens above with assurance. Nevertheless, there appears to be a profound anxiety 
in the “Dionysian” passage of limits, physical and metaphysical, and this has implications for 
the work done by monotheism in relation to other practices of the sacred. The inscription of 
a limit, enacted in and as a given community set under foreclosure (from the Garden and in 
mortality), takes the place of phantasy identifications, Dionysian dreaming, and practices of 
sacred fusion. In Genesis, the separation implicit in the narrator’s irony: “man is become as 
one of us”—an irony that arises from the implicit negation that this suggests18—reiterates 
the oppositions of existence, understood from the perspective of mortal beings. What is 
finite cannot become infinite without monstrosity. The infinite (God, trace or voice) knows, 
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but is not subject to the forces that structure finite life itself: space-time, historicality, and the 
demonry or drive quality of willing-to-know and to-be-infinite.  
  
Identification as Incorporation and the Transformation of the Voice 
When Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy claim that “the Jewish people does not dream,” 
they are carrying Buber’s meditation on finitude and the dialectic of forces a step further. 
Buber understood that a thoroughgoing identification with the God (or the mythic Father) 
could only be phantasmatic. Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy explore the implications of the 
foreclosure of such identifications in light of cultural sublimation.. With the containment or 
limitation of phantasmatic identification, a different “law” becomes possible. Like all laws, 
this law brings about differences (minimally, the legal and the illegal). Culturally and 
historically, it gives the repetition of events a different quality, an ethico-gestural quality in 
which no one stands above the “law” because no one, be they shaman or seer, ascends to or 
otherwise incarnates the transcendental object. I do not mean that there is no ethical 
normativity in cultures whose religious practices ritually enact phantasmatic identifications. 
However, this enactment has implications for their conceptions of time and the cosmos. It is 
enough to say, for now, that following the new or different law is not the same as identifying 
phantasmatically with the Father, because the limitation set on identification gives us a law 
that is now open to human completion in history. It therefore becomes open to the 
community, as every member of that community brings a new interpretation of it to the 
group.19 The complete comprehension of the law becomes a regulative, and social, ideal.20 
But this infinite is neither fusional (i.e., I incarnate the law) nor vertical (i.e., I rise to the 
God). It ramifies. 
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The second consequence of “not dreaming” is the limitation set on imaginary 
elaborations on the immortality of the soul and the survival of the dead. Nothing eradicates 
the memory and desire that immortalize an ancestor, but his fetishization may be subverted 
if it is subject to questioning, or worse to irony. This entails the symbolic limitation of 
repetitions that, in mythic logics like that of the totemic father, become tragic because they 
enact an enduring malaise tied to agonizing loss, like a ghost whose law and words insist, 
determining the destiny of the group. For example, when we look at the repetition 
compulsion of Freud’s “Wolf Man,” we find that each male authority incarnates and repeats 
the Wolf Man’s subjugation by his father. So much for the psychological level; but we should 
recall the tragic conviction characteristic of Greek tragedy: Whatever you do, whether it is to 
avenge my name or to escape that responsibility, you shall only repeat the course of events 
that is your fate.21 These illustrations show the widespread operation, and phantasmatic 
efficacy of the “not-quite-dead” (parents, ancestors, heroes; all objects of identification) in 
their relation to the living, who can only lose their own lives in that “infernal” relation. The 
symbolic foreclosure of such immortalities makes possible the creation of a community that 
is not defined by identifications such as “we are x being,” or “we carry within us, as our 
destiny, Him who was our Father.”  
Together, the formal abandonment of ancestor cults, spectral forces taken as 
presences—and the non-figurability of God (iconically or in name)—forces the work of 
finitude to take place. It does so by way of three factors: (1) the task of continuous 
interpretation; (2) the configuration of a full if dia-chronous time as repeating holy days that 
inflect the past into the future, without destroying everyday time; and finally, (3) through a 
messianic temporality of generations to come, in which a promise of justice persists as it 
changes (along with the conditions of pardon and return), though never taking form as 
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“parousia” or fulfilled presence. These result from the foreclosure that Nancy and Lacoue-
Labarthe present in shorthand as “Jews not dreaming.” There is a dialectic between them. 
In “The Tree of Knowledge” Buber insists that it was no punishment to be banished 
from the Garden of Eden. Yet his claim seems strange. In the Garden, did Adam not walk 
with God? Was Adam not both creature and adult (only to find himself relegated to a kind of 
infancy and serfdom after his expulsion)? Of course, his peculiar temporality remains an 
open question. Be that as it may, Adam is initially more than human and less than human—
like a phantasy. In fact, he is there, in this figuration of pre-human time, curiously less a 
“being”, less “existent” than when he “becomes” finite. Garden humans are at once 
inbreathed dust (המדא ;םדא) and immortals (provided they do not sin). Other immortals or 
semi-mortals show up in Genesis, and their commerce with humans is also catastrophic (the 
Nephilim, Genesis 6: 1-5). However, if to be human is to be possessed of a finite temporality 
without being wholly condemned by it, and if the beginnings of one’s humanity are 
accompanied by a logos that is reason and communication, then how could the Garden 
Creature—though he had names for animals—grasp that existence “is” in the mode of 
“finite becoming”? It could not mean much to Adam and Even to envision eating something 
forbidden, something that would make them “like” God. However, clearly, becoming like 
God was desirable, just as the fruits of the Tree were appetizing. Now, psychoanalysis 
teaches that incorporation or object cathexis is the material ground of any identification, but 
Adam and Eve understood neither finitude nor identification and its dangers. The Garden 
beings knew neither the desire that characterizes creatures with sexuate bodies, nor the 
difference between them and that voice called Elohim, and certainly not the separation that 
identification denies.22 
 14 
Perhaps expulsion was better than an act of mercy (since mortality, which became 
the property of humans when they could not eat of the Tree of Life, was a boon given their 
contradictory “divine” knowledge). It was a better than mere mercy, because the narrative 
expulsion forced the creation of a fledgling community that took shape through a dialectic of 
identification and dis-identification which, as we indicated, permitted an alternative (and less 
meta-physical) conception of social existence. The foreclosure of identification, as the first 
premise of negative “theology”, is coextensive with a social logos of human interrelations, 
coming to pass in the presence of an unfigurable “transformer”: the present-absent Third 
party (Elohim/Yahweh).  
This third party is exemplified both in the unknowable One and in the Law itself. 
Indeed, what is exemplified are two types of diremption: that between humans and their 
creator; that between humans and the (interpretable) structures of value and preference 
(Law). But the Third party has a third sense as well. It is exemplified by the absent mythical 
narrator of Genesis, about whom Buber argues that “he” was aware of the irony implicit in 
the origin that was the expulsion from the Garden.23 The human genesis is thus not the 
creation of Adam, but the coming-into-humanity-as-finite of the two proto-humans, thanks 
to the “magical” increase in their “knowledge,” brought about by the crudest mode of 
assimilation-identification: eating. This magical increase of knowledge is the beginning of the 
knowledge of becoming—which lies both within and without human powers. As magic, this 
will be foreclosed; hence, the expulsion. Now, the knowledge of becoming is that of coming 
into and passing out of being, birth and death—preeminently, the death of the other person. 
So it was hardly tragic that the pair could not eat of the tree of Eternal Life, because 
possessing the knowledge of death is the only way through which humans grasp non-becoming, 
stasis, and correlatively, eternity as privation (life lost) and promise (hope of a life afterward). 
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Without this ethical knowledge (since my knowledge of death is always that of the other 
person), the Garden Adam is more infinite than finite, undecidably mortal and immortal, as I 
indicated. For human beings, who are born rather than created, there is more value in 
knowing that one dies than in possessing immortality with no understanding of becoming or 
mortality. Thus the narrative voice of Genesis stands in the position of the Third party: “In 
this lamentable effect of the great magic of becoming like God, the narrator’s irony becomes 
apparent; an irony whose source was obviously great suffering through the nature of man,” 
as Buber observes (BGB 615; OB, 19).  
 
Nakedness and Becoming 
 The immediate, perceptible consequence for Adam and Eve of their eating the fruit 
of knowledge was a paltry discovery: their reciprocal nakedness. Against any “wild 
psychoanalysis,” Buber writes that the “recognition of this fact, the only recorded 
consequence of the magical partaking, cannot be adequately explained on the basis of 
sexuality, although without the latter it is, of course, inconceivable” (BGB, 615; OB, 19). His 
arguments in this text imply that the expulsion was a divine second thought—not the direct 
consequence of eating the fruit—as though God sought to protect them from the deadly 
combination of shame, and the hubris of knowledge, not to mention the expansion of this 
combination into eternity. At the moment when their eyes are opened, it is not clear what 
the consequences of their act will be. The serpent promised god-likeness. But Eve, Buber 
tells us, first “intensified [verschärft] God’s prohibition” with her surprising response to the 
serpent, “touch it not, else you must die” (BGB, 610; OB, 15).24 Since it was not clear what 
god-likeness or death might be, what could it mean that Eve intensified the prohibition? 
Interestingly, she did not simply mimic the injunction since, when Adam received it, Eve had 
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not yet been created. And again, if to die means to disappear or to cease to be, then this too 
remains only an abstract possibility for creatures whose bodies are suspended in the nunc 
stans of the Garden. The vertiginous play of perspectives here between the demonic, the 
divine, and the “Adamic” opens conundrums that can be worked out only after the 
introduction of a foreclosure. That is, following the separation that is figured simultaneously 
as a decision of the absent Father (the voice, see Genesis 3: 19), and as the expulsion from 
paradise into finite space-time. 
 The immediate outcome is nakedness. The first nakedness, however, was that of the 
serpent itself, “the serpent was naked, more [naked] than any living thing of the field that 
YHWH/Adonai/Elohim had created” (Genesis 3: 1). But Adam and Eve’s nakedness is less 
that of a state that excites desire than an “unnatural uncoveredness” that elicits shame. Is 
this also the nakedness of the serpent? I will return to that question. Of course, the all-too-
human exposure, in nakedness and shame is unthinkable in a non-domesticated animal, even 
one that speaks and walks around the Garden. Still, shame is neither guilt nor sin. It is closer 
to phenomenological descriptions of those affective moments in which “we are unable to 
make others forget our basic nudity.”25 Fundamental nudity belongs to the finitude of 
human flesh and this deepens the irony Buber attributed to the narrative voice. Having 
become “as gods,” our new, divinized (or de-divinized?) beings have become more human, 
shamefaced, and exposed to each other, as well as to the absent One who always saw them 
naked—at least until the moment he lost sight of Adam’s whereabouts!26 If it is divine to 
suffer in one’s exposure, then Adam and Eve have become more divine. If it is not divine to 
suffer in this way, then their knowledge has brought them only into the “demonic” state that 
more readily typifies the human (and serpentine) condition, and which Freud referred to as a 
condition governed by Triebe (drives). The act of consumption, understood as Verkörperung 
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or incorporation, is in mythic logic a mimetic act that repeats a sacrificial rite that devours 
and perpetuates an ancestor or totem animal as the divinity. Here, incorporation through 
consumption leads to “knowledge” and, had Adam and Eve eaten of the Tree of Life, this 
would have led to their incarnation—really, to the parodic mimesis—of the Father himself.27  
The consequence of Verkörperung is wonderfully described in Freud’s Totem and Taboo 
(1913) and in Moses and Monotheism (1939). There, anxiety and shame arise from the 
transgression that denudes, strips bare. But the transgression, which is always a kind of 
murder, or at least usurpation, brings about a perverse equalization—whether this be the 
creation of a band of brothers (who have eliminated the father, as in Totem and Taboo), or two 
humans who come “to know” what the Father alone knew (without knowing in quite the 
way he did). It is remarkable that the first textual illustration of the uncrossable separation 
between being and becoming, infinity and finitude, is repeated through a host of biblical 
narratives from the Deluge (Genesis 6: 1), to the Tower of Babel (Genesis 11: 1),—as 
though this lesson required repetition in variation, because it belonged to a complex gesture 
of ethical, social, and political importance. 
 A perplexity remains with the re-cognition implicit in seeing the other as naked. What 
role does this recognition play in the origin of a human subject? To answer this question, 
another one must first be explored: How is existence, understood as change and becoming, 
known to the creature who ate the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge? To understand this, I 
need to make an etymological detour. Thereafter, I will return to the connection between 
Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, Buber, and Freud. 
Erum: Being Naked, Yet Shrewd 
Before the events described in Genesis 3, Adam and Eve are characterized as 
“Arummim.”28 Arummim is the plural of “Arum” (“naked” or “smooth”) for which a 
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recognized alternative spelling is “Erum.” It is said at the end of Genesis 2 that these two 
beings who were “one flesh,” “felt no shame.”29 From the opening of chapter 3, the Arum 
theme unfolds in all its equivocity; and this, by way of superlatives. “Now the serpent was 
the shrewdest of all the wild beasts that the Lord God had made” (Genesis 3: 1, in the King 
James translation). “Shrewdest”, here, means simultaneously “most naked”, “fleshly”, 
because without fur or feathers, and “crafty”, “cunning”, “cautious” or “prudent”. Erum 
associates all these connotations. Because it is the naked “wild beast” that speaks to Eve, we 
might say that in matters of knowledge and morality, the serpent was more readily the 
interlocutor of the “humans” than the humans were to each other, or even to God. The 
serpent was clearly shrewder than the two innocents, and some commentaries argue that it 
must have gone about upright, since the curse placed on it was what obliged it to slither 
about on its belly (Genesis 3: 14). Thinking this way, the serpent becomes simultaneously 
proto-human in its reason and its nakedness (it would have been  the most naked of the 
featherless bipeds), and better than human in its synthetic knowledge of the meaning of death 
and “divine perception.”30 It occupies what may be a standard position in mythic logic of the 
third party that knows more than mortals and sets itself in opposition to the omniscience of 
the divinity.  
The acquisition of knowledge by humans results in the curse on the serpent itself—
and its demotion to the rank of something worse than cattle (Genesis 3: 14). The curse on 
Adam is in fact a curse upon the ground over which he moved (and of which he is made), 
which he would have henceforth to toil. In the case of the serpent, the curse is set directly 
upon its being and on its body (it slithers henceforth on its abdomen). In the case of the 
humans, it is a curse on the nature of the work that the new humans have to perform and on 
their relationship to each other. The difference between these two curses is crucial, because 
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if religion arises, as Hermann Cohen pointed out, contemporaneous with reason and with 
the essence of the Law, then there existed an upright being that spoke and knew, and yet was 
not clearly comparable to humans or to angels: the serpent, incarnation of a polysemic 
“smoothness”. The one thing this creature lacked was that it was not explicitly created “after 
our likeness” (Genesis 1: 26). This means that a being could exist who knew and spoke, yet 
was apparently less divine than those two who initially did not know the forces of life and 
could not communicate with the refinement that such knowledge procured. In fairness, it is 
only in Genesis 3: 22—i.e., after the pronouncement of God’s threefold curse—that the 
tradition integrated the second aspect of the Eden allegory: the presence of two forbidden 
trees.  
 If we pursue the question of nakedness this time in light of the shame that Adam and 
Eve did not initially feel, then we find another interpretive path. This one Buber opens 
through his analysis of the meaning of “knowledge of good and evil.” If “good and evil” 
amount to Being, or better, to Life, understood as omnipresent binaristic forces (pain and 
pleasure, benefit and discomfort, fullness and emptiness), then this knowledge may well be 
possessed affectively before it is represented as an object of reason.31 In other words, we stand 
in relation to what-is through our various modes of sensibility and affectivity. So far as these 
open us to existence, it is not absurd to consider them “attunements,” like Heidegger’s 
Stimmungen, among which are joy, boredom, and Angst32—and to which Levinas will add 
enjoyment, shame, fatigue, and nausea. These affective attunements, whatever their number, 
can only be suspected of our early “humans”, Adam and Eve. If anything, what we find is 
delight and the apatheia that receives imperatives without fear or pondering. After that comes 
the shame that fears evil; shame before a God (or Father) transformed, and anxiety—
something like the anxiety of responsibility. Even here, these modes of “knowing” have little 
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representational content outside the perception of an enduring lack. There is nothing 
elaborately moral present here. Yet the spectacle of their nudity is also not an aesthetic one, 
no judgment of beauty or ugliness accompanies it. Stricken with mortality, the flesh has not 
so much become ugly as its vulnerability elicits shame and redoubled anxiety. Sexuality, 
moreover, is henceforth “socialized”, that is, subject to knowledge which itself has received 
the sanction of the law (i.e., the taboo). The haste with which Adam and Eve cloaked 
themselves in leaves, and retreated to a position of invisibility, which alone could assure 
some restoration of their lost wholeness, implies that the divine third party has consequently 
become more fixed, more explicitly seeing, and potentially punitive (we are seeing things, 
now, through their eyes). The “God” who now sees them as naked, always saw them thus, 
only now they realize it. What must have been his perplexity to find the two suddenly striving 
for invisibility and hiding!  
The sad irony is that this God not only must now evict his creatures, he must 
institute a symbol of foreclosure. That is the function of the “fiery ever-turning sword,” 
which guards the Tree of Life from the creatures’ eventual return (Genesis 3: 24). 
Henceforth, Adam and Eve will see the third precisely as a Third: as separated, whole, the 
source of a law revealed to them in reason and shame. By virtue of separation-foreclosure, 
they also see in each other a third party (“and I will put enmity between thee and the 
woman,” Genesis 3: 15), i.e., a being outside the I-thou binary. To be the other, in the sense 
of I and thou, a human being must be a naked face, a gaze, and an interruption of the same 
forces of which he has become aware.33 But to be the Other is also to be a Third; one 
perhaps like-me, yet who is not like-me—and above all who judges me and my other. At this 
point, Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy’s reflection points us in a direction that runs directly 
parallel with Buber’s thought. 
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The Psychoanalytic Counter-Narrative: The Birth of Anxiety in Transgression and 
Traumatism 
 For Freud, anxiety was “the paradigm of affect” (PJNRP). This is true despite the 
important changes he introduced into his arguments about its meaning.3435 Thus, by 1926, 
the mature Freud conceived the “subject” of psychoanalysis by integrating his first topic 
(primary and secondary processes) into the second one (i.e., the Ich, Es, and Über-ich). In so 
doing, he inverted his early conception of anxiety as a sign of repression having encountered 
a plethora of cases where anxiety signaled no discernible Verdrängung. Freud then argued that 
anxiety was more than the affective symptom of a host of developmental processes and 
pathology. Anxiety preceded repression in its origin, and it could exist independently of it. 
As the neuro-physiological turmoil of the neonate, anxiety even preceded the formation of 
the Ego. It arose as the physiological reaction to the danger of suffocation. Freud’s 1933 “New 
Introductory Lectures,” which present psychoanalysis in its final form, define anxiety as a 
reaction to traumata, the first of which was birth itself.36 Trauma anxiety will repeat over the 
course of the emergence of the Ego, and continue afterward, thanks to the retroactive 
intensification of earlier incidents that carry on into the present. This is where Moses and 
Monotheism takes it up. There, trauma anxiety is extended to the prehistory of the species 
itself:  
…mankind as a whole also passed through conflicts of a sexual-aggressive 
nature, which left permanent traces, but which were for the most part 
warded off and forgotten; later, after a long period of latency, they came to life 
again and created phenomena similar in structure and tendency to neurotic 
symptoms…the phenomena of religion. (MAM, 101)  
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 In humans’ prehistory—which is also the history figured in Buber’s study of the 
myth of expulsion—the primary symbolic anxiety (“permanent traces”) arose from the 
trauma experienced by the sons following their transgression, putatively, the violent 
elimination of the dominant male (Freud called him the Urvater). Cultural recurrence thus 
parallels the repetition-intensification of trauma, as found in individual neuroses.37 This logic 
also contains an inexpungible nostalgia for the strange innocence in which the Third party 
(“God”) is near but does not judge us. This is an innocence destroyed by the will to know 
and by the realization of mortality, which the Garden allegory figures as the expulsion. 
We can interpret Freud’s “permanent traces” as ingrained developmental memories 
or as the transmission of acculturated affects. Yet more important is the ongoing return of a 
repressed trace. Despite Freud’s embrace of recapitulation theory (“ontogenesis reproduces 
phylogenesis”) and his occasional Lamarckianism, it is historic transmission that is at stake. By 
historic transmission, I mean the passing on of cultural history, concentrated in parables and 
myths, as well as the transmission brought about by the repetition of behaviors engendered 
by a malaise in a family or a society. The remarkable thing here is that the people who would 
ultimately become “Jews” embodied the force and the desire that instituted the law of the 
Third in a monotheistic form. By Freud’s account (working from archeological material),38 it 
was the Jews who revived the religion of the Father-God and with it, the foreclosures 
figured by the Garden and normalized in the Mosaic proscriptions. In this respect, they had 
an original claim to the status of “not dreaming”. Monotheism forecloses with peculiar 
power identifications with God and heroes, such as those we see in polytheism. According 
to the psychoanalytical account, the early Hebrews enacted what had become their cultural 
unconscious, by confronting the reforms proposed by their own priests, who were anxious 
to modify the absolute monotheism and embrace a more natural, almost imperial volcano-
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God called Yahweh. Anxiety would thus have persisted among the people like a demand that 
the unattainable Third be revived in all his distance (distance is an effect of foreclosure). 
Whether this anxiety was due primarily to Freud’s “structure” or “return of the repressed”—
here reenacted in the intent to murder Moses (Exodus 4: 24)—or to the loss of the privilege 
of election by the one God, is unclear. What is clear is that the foreclosure of acts of 
anthropomorphic instating (e.g., a plurality of gods, divinized ancestors, sacred entities and 
forces that figure human passions) characterizes the monotheism that Moses supposedly 
taught to a people who then preserved, unconsciously, his founding intuition. 
If we follow Freud’s speculation about the Egyptian Moses and those nomads who 
perpetuated his abstract god, we confront a circle of origins: was it a psycho-social repetition 
that motivated the demand to reinstitute this monotheism? If so, we should accept the 
hypothesis of Moses’s own murder (and the persistence of guilt attaching to his memory). 
Or was it some anxiety, embedded in the popular imagination, that motivated the restitution 
of an all-powerful, absent One who, despite his distance from humans, elected one people 
from among the nations?  If election-in-distance does diminish Angst—about mortality, or 
facing political and cultural threats—then why was this “option” not more prominent among 
the mythic choices made by early peoples? Was this rarity due to the psychic impact of the 
foreclosure on identification? Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy abbreviate this foreclosure as 
being placed simply “on dreaming.” But it applies to virtually every form of fetishization and 
hypostatization.39 If we follow the parallelism Freud drew between the rites and narratives of 
religions, the practices of re-enactment, partial remembering, and the transference 
characteristic of neuroses, we encounter yet another circle. This is the circle of anxiety itself. 
If anxiety is a privileged bridge between sensation and affectivity (mechanistic sensation and 
“spiritual” emotion), then anxiety holds the body-mind parallelism in place, in what amounts 
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to a discontinuous proximity (sensation is not affect, and conversely; but affect often 
accompanies sensation). Of course, anxiety also evinces cultural aspects: an entire cultural 
group can be beset with, and transmit, its anxiety.  
In Freud’s second topic, the primacy of this curious sensation-affect expresses the 
impossibility of positing an archē for the Ego, since there is at least one pre-egoïc affect that 
evolves with the emerging Ego and only later appears to belong to the Ego. But the 
difficulty of stating when precisely “I” am there, when the Ego that inhabits its name takes 
form, was not Freud’s intuition alone. Even if it was not thematized clinically, the narrative 
of the Garden and the expulsion also concerns the difficult archē of the human. Moreover, the 
perplexing, archetypal murder of the powerful male—who, in perishing, returns to haunt the 
sons and elicit from them a rejection of violence and inauguration of “legal” foreclosures—
presents a comparable anxiety structure, albeit at a different level. This discontinuous 
repetition, like the repetitions of anxiety in the individual, seems to be the only affective 
“structure” thinkable in the absence of identifiable origins. If the earliest stages of social 
existence emerge thanks to the expulsion from paradise into mortality, foreclosure, and 
nakedness, then this sociability must be enhanced by an additional gesture—purely human 
this time—whereby the sons (of Adam) re-cognize that they are also brothers. That is, they 
come with difficulty to realize that they are not simply individuals elected by the father, but 
can also form a pact amongst each other.  
Freud and Buber: The Work of Foreclosure 
We thus face two circles of origin and two hypotheses about Judaism. Buber’s 
reading of Genesis illustrates an initial foreclosure that will be repeated over the history of 
the Jewish people. Freud’s Moses sketches the psychological history of a God, or Father, 
occupying a unique structure of the Third party (sole legislator, unknowable, alone in 
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electing his chosen), by virtue of foreclosures recorded in the people’s narrative and carried 
by that people like a permanent mnemonic trace. The point of intersection of the two 
readings, Buber and Freud’s (and with Freud, Lacoue-Labarthe et al.), lies precisely in the 
work performed by foreclosure. Of course, the Genesis narrative and the story of Moses 
belong to two different layers of Jewish history. And the proscriptions on magic, 
representation, and polytheism stand in a certain tension to Freud’s reading of Verkörperung, 
the primitive identification consisting of incorporations that pass from eating the apple all 
the way to totemic meals and, ultimately, to the Christian Eucharist. For Adam and Eve, 
eating the proscribed fruit is closer to magical consumption than it is to murder. In Freud’s 
reconstruction, the two are connected through survivals of ancient cannibalism (MAM, 103). 
To my mind, the connection has more to do with the incomprehensible but sensed outcome 
(by Adam and Eve) of this consumption. To become “as one of us” is, for a creature, to 
supplant its creator. Nevertheless, following the logic of foreclosure, the incorporation that 
elicited expulsion puts an end to such “dreaming” (the Garden is as much a dream as is the 
divinization of beings, garden or worldly ones).  
If we consider the two levels of drives, in a self and in a group (or a culture)—
something Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy’s work encourages—then we understand their claim 
for the work of foreclosure. At an individual level, Freud pushes Buber’s arguments by 
insisting that anxiety is the affect in which inside and outside, man and God, paradise and 
society, blur. Such indistinctions additionally evoke anxiety and must be limited.40 On the 
other hand, Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy argue that the sociality of ethnic and political 
identifications is actually superposed on a more originary sociality through the logic of 
repetition. Again, murder can be compared with the taboo on the Tree of Life, because 
murder—of the paradigmatic strong male and as a deliberate act—entails “the social 
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comprehension (or ‘incomprehension’) of death. It is itself the ambivalence of dis-sociation: 
the appearance of an Ego in its disappearance, the relation that arises from the lack of a relation” 
(PJNRP, 70; 205). According to Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, the deliberate sacrifice or 
murder of this Father turns on the knowledge that death is final, and it is what happens to 
others, leaving behind it the survivors whose act and new status forge the new pact uniting 
those who reassemble under a nascent “social contract”. Eating of the Tree of Knowledge is 
also decided in the affective indeterminacy of anxiety (i.e., Eve knew neither what knowledge 
of all things would mean nor what death was), with a peculiarly social outcome: the 
succession of generations, or human history. The sociality of the brothers forged by murder 
is ambiguous and unforeseen. However, it must rest on some earlier social life thanks to 
which the choice can actually be made to forego election by the strongest male for the sake 
of a more horizontal organization.  
Murder (and perhaps expulsion) thus bespeaks something like a will to sociability, 
which congeals in the refusal of tyranny, natural or political. This will and this act restore 
what the expulsion from the Garden made possible, a “primitive horde” (MAM, 114). Both 
murder and expulsion evince the aporia of origins, with the primitive horde standing in a 
circular relationship to the ancient “Father.” And it is curious that, in all but a brief essay he 
sent to Ferenczi, Freud maintained (in Totem and Taboo [1912] and in Moses and Monotheism 
[1939]) that in the beginning was the strong male41—who nevertheless lorded it over “the 
whole horde,” itself already in existence, if unreflectively (MAM, 102).42  
Freud’s published works de-emphasized the original horde in favor of the 
community under a strong male. He did not reckon with something like the group 
consciousness of a social identity, because the proverbial sons are defined in light of one 
who was not really their biological father (paternity being a causality they did not know), but 
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simply their tyrant. Whatever the circumstances of their survival, however, Freud does argue 
that it was the expulsion of the sons that introduced them to a new, and unstable, “state of 
nature”. He observes, “they [the parricides] were forced to live in small communities” 
(MAM, 103). These small communities were presumably without strong males, at least for a 
time. All of that was insufficient to transform what Freud refers to as “sons” into 
“brothers.” Only the overcoming of the father and the partaking of his body assured that 
further evolution. “The cannibalistic act thus becomes comprehensible as an attempt to 
assure one’s identification with the father by incorporating a part of him” (MAM, 103). 
Chiasmatic, the two levels of sociality—that of the tyrant and that of the brothers—
take shape through a decisive act of vengeance following the initial expulsion by the Father. 
If the sociality of the brothers, post-sacrifice, in no way protects them against the returns of 
the Father, a vague consciousness of the threat of judgment and murder persists; and when a 
father-substitute returns, as he will, it will likely be as a father-son, i.e., as a “mortal”, already 
marked by the possibility of murder. The innovation of Jesus—really, that of Paul—carries a 
trace of the foreclosure of the position of absolute Father. If this innovation revives a 
“phantasy of salvation” (MAM, 110), it carries with it henotheistic ambiguities (Jesus, man-
God next to the Father), which the expulsion from the Garden had foreclosed. To be sure, 
the messianic supplement is found first in the Hebrew prophets, but it is transformed in 
Paul’s Father-Son synthesis, which Freud suspected was the only remaining mode of return 
for the Father. If this is the unique return of the erstwhile Father (MAM, 111), then it is such 
because it is the effect of a mnemonic trace, something like a cultural impensé that has no 
need to be transmitted in a naïve Lamarckian fashion.43 As a blurring of divine and human, 
the new-old Father, who is also a Son, reopens the possibility of fusional or fetishistic 
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identifications. These are identifications similar to those we find in myths and epics peopled 
by semi-divine heroes. And there begins the worst conundrum. 
Oedipus and Moses: Paradoxes of Paternity 
When Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy argue that Oedipus might replace Moses as 
“history’s only real Father, a father who accepts himself as such” (PJNRP, 70; 205), they are 
resisting Freud’s vector-like logic of repetition, whose paradox is to have posited an origin 
(archaic murder), despite its dating from a time immemorial. Instead, Lacoue-Labarthe and 
Nancy emphasize that one becomes a father only in becoming conscious that one has 
sacrificed or murdered one’s own father, their claim being that Moses was an unconscious 
father. Now, one becomes conscious only through the repetition the similar, through whose 
social traces a certain awareness congeals, initially as a shared affect, then through actions. 
Through the work of repetition (and resistance in psychoanalytic theory), they argue that 
only the recognition of repressed violence opens to a sociality able to identify itself as 
ethnicity or as a micro-polis. This parallels Freud’s theme of Durcharbeitung, working or 
talking through a neurotic condition (i.e., our condition as human beings). Yet the mature 
Freud saw something different in “the return of the father-son” avatar. He speculated that 
the source of Christian anti-Semitism lay precisely in a certain Christian notion of 
recognition: Christians had “murdered God; as against the Jews who, at least according to a 
standard version of the story of Moses, would not admit that they murdered God (as the 
archetype of God, the primeval father, and his reincarnations)” (MAM, 115).  
Thus, either one forecloses access to God ab initio, and unravels the structure of 
identification (i.e., identification as “occupying the place of the other,” which implies 
murder, latency, revivification of a memory, and the repetition of identification), or one 
reenacts the process, thereby reopening the ancient dilemmas. That is the choice, unless 
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recognition of the murder also forecloses identification. Clearly, it does this—selectively. The 
case of Oedipus is interesting as a “hero” who, inhabiting the monstrosity of his flaw (to 
defy ᾿Ανάγκη or natural necessity, and fail at it), presaged the end of the repetitions by his 
disappearance en route to Colonnus. 
Tragedy, Irony, and the Witz 
 Is the return of the son the condition sine qua non of socio-ethnic “paternity”?  Or 
does the son represent a supplementary acquisition, which makes fatherhood simultaneously 
social and temporal through the continuity and stabilization of generations? Clearly, for 
Freud, the depth, which “in the Jewish religion resulted from the murder of its founder” 
(MAM, 118), is not shared by Islam (and presumably not by Paul’s Christianity of 
resurrection, either). That sets Freud apart from Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy’s claims for 
Oedipus’ superiority to, or equality with Moses. Does not the essential force of catharsis, 
which the representation of Oedipus enables, turn on identification with him, however 
tormented? It would seem that this identification is not fetishistic. But if Lacoue-Labarthe 
and Nancy are right in suggesting that Freud glimpsed a model of deferred identification in 
“the Jewish story” (PJNRP, 194), this is because the Jewish story he had in mind, as the 
model of Jewish social identification, carried irony. It was thus related to the Witz about 
which he wrote during the “triumphalist” period of psychoanalysis (1905-1915). The Witz 
expresses a particular sort of social identification in which the author of the joke is a 
member of his or her target group. The ironic or comedic quality comes from this group’s 
collective personality; it is a Sammlungsperson, from which the joker is able to take some 
distance. The Witz short-circuits a direct or vectorial mimesis by preserving distance. It does 
this, thanks precisely to the proximity-distance of the satirist and his or her object. In this 
gesture of self-ironization, a distinct or deferred identification takes place, which opens to 
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thought. Humor is thus like the irony that Buber observed of the narrator of Genesis; the 
distancing effects are similar.44  
The ironic tone of the narrative voice in Genesis 3 brought about a comparable 
distance and return. There is no way to identify fetishistically with the Father when 
confronting the Third party who is Elohim/Adonai. For Buber, the expulsion from the 
Garden opens to a history that is human first, and becoming-a-people, second; that is, the 
first “murder” (by incorporation), followed by foreclosure (by expulsion), recapitulates an 
original sociality (unmediated identification with an indeterminate entity: a divine voice), only 
to open to the new social structures of kin and tribe (of brothers). All too human, we 
suppose. However, as Freud adds in regard to Moses—and the Gospels—these are stories 
told about Jews among Jews (MAM, 117).  
Unmediated fusional identification was not the lot of the Jews, who returned to the 
monotheism of Moses, after the sacerdotal compromise in their religious practices (1350 and 
1215 BCE, in MAM, 75, 85). Forces among the people presumably impelled this return, 
which was the revival of their original “obscure and incomplete tradition” of radical 
monotheism (MAM, 89). For Freud, this is the return of the repressed, but it differs from 
such returns in Greek tragedy. Something more is underway, however, as this “repressed” 
contains a unique stimulus toward ethical norms and self-respect. At the heart of the return-
restoration of the primeval Father45 is a temporal lag that Freud compares to latency in 
individuals’ psychosexual development. This latency separates subjects from the thrall of the 
drives as from their initial identifications (MAM, 100-1). Now, the value of developmental 
latency parallels the (latent) time of discovery essential to the Witz. The surprise of the joke 
lies in the sudden discovery that the addressor has cloaked himself with a story, of which he 
is the part standing in for the whole or the Sammlungsperson, which is also the comic object.  
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In Buber’s reading of Genesis 3, the loss of the father is figured spatially first, as it 
occurs thanks to the expulsion, which orders space into sacred and profane sites while 
instituting the repeating and self-differentiating time of generations. This temporality must 
be understood on two levels. First, because it is anything but the “all at once” time Buber 
attributes to divine knowledge, diachronic time is social and biological. It echoes the time of 
the narrative itself. In an ironic sense—made possible by the repetition imperative 
characteristic of the narrative (to be told and retold)—it is always the time of the Garden, 
always the time of foreclosure. Here, the foreclosure is the narrative (moment) that recounts 
(and incorporates) its incipience as a narrative (“I am telling you this story because I am, like 
you, a part of the generations begun thanks to the expulsion”). Second, if the temporality of 
ethnic sociality is unleashed by a traumatic loss, we have learned, through Freud, that trauma 
may be exogenic or endogenic in origin, but it will persist as though it were each time 
exogenic—like the incursion or imprinting of an external force.  
Whether we consider the trauma of the murder of the Father or that of the expulsion 
and foreclosure of immortality, the anxiety that characterizes the return of the repressed 
inaugurates a strange urge for self-identification. For, anxiety is similarly characterized by a 
repeating time that has no origin. After mistaking anxiety for a mere symptom, Freud 
acknowledged that anxiety precedes the consolidation of the Ego, and its recurrence isolates 
the Ego, as though its identifications could never fully ground it. Anxiety repeats the trauma 
of an origin at which the Ego had not yet developed. With each repetition, anxiety changes 
by virtue of its attachment to different objects. As Freud argued in Inhibitions, Symptoms and 
Anxiety (1926), through the repetitions of anxiety “a danger-situation” is “a recognized, 
remembered, expected situation of helplessness.”46 But the shock it repeats proves 
immemorial, because indefinitely retraceable. “It is unrecognizable because it consists of 
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ever-changing cathexes (Besetzung) that can be “recognized” only by being 
displaced…disfigured (ent-stellt). And it is immemorial, because the ‘actual’ situation of 
helplessness resists the bifurcation into past and future that is the condition of memory and 
anticipation.”47 Identification flowing from anxiety might prove fetishistic or ironic, in its 
origin and its repetitions, however, it reflects a striving to stabilize the anxious Ego. 
Anarchism and the Circle of Origin, or: Why the Jewish People does not Dream 
 The complex of repetition and displacement with no determinate archē characterizes 
the latency and recurrence found in Freud’s hypothesis of the Vatermord. The displacement 
that encourages recognition corresponds to a prohibition that excludes mimetic attributions 
(becoming “as gods”). The circle of origin, replaying itself and lacking a fixed starting point, 
is thus preserved. Almost despite himself, Freud discerned a circle of origin in anxiety and in 
the murder of the father. I believe he would have appreciated Buber’s glimpsing it in the 
situation of presence-absence and transgression, which occasioned the (ironic) expulsion. 
More important than a de facto murder of a powerful male, which, Freud insisted, occurs in 
every culture, is the social and contractual impetus (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy call it a 
“social drive”) that motivates the weaker males to associate in opposition to the proto-
father. No accident, then, that Freud pursued his study of Moses and of the phenomena of 
identification together, even as he protested his ineptitude in the dubious domain of 19th 
century mass psychology, “where we do not feel at home” (MAM, 87).48 In all three cases, 
the an-archy of the narrative origin comes to light. But this circle and these displacements in 
repetition are significant. The danger (of loss and traumatism) to which anxiety reacts is real, 
even if irrecoverable. But it cannot be “self-identical.”49 So too, the danger that the return of 
the repressed implies for individual and “social” psyches. Eating from the Tree of eternal life 
would have destroyed this time of repetition, which is the time of mortality—there is no 
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time of eternity that is narratively meaningful (short perhaps of death). Sense requires the 
self-structuring of narrative acts. The first principle, spatialized as the Garden, serves as the 
site of humans’ unconscious proximity to divinity, which Buber called the “yes position”. 
But this principle is a null site without traces. There is no initial trace of separation here for 
two reasons: first, the paternal commands in the Garden are as incomprehensible to the 
proto-humans as the “father” is (until he judges, he is almost their companion, a present-
absent voice). Second, there is no viable “subject” and the object (God) is unfigurable, 
though not thanks to any prohibition on representation.  
Value judgments are incomprehensible to beings that live beyond good and evil in 
undifferentiated communion with Buber’s “yes” and “all.” But the irony of a beginning that 
is not really a beginning, precisely here, is unmistakable. Our first humans are physical adults 
who, when they lose their spiritual status as children (with no need for adulthood so long as 
they are “in God”), enter into an adulthood without fullness, in which desire is fragmented 
(i.e., they are exposed, naked, ashamed; the earth from which they are made is cursed). That 
is why the expulsion—which Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy call the stuff of “maternal 
identification”50—inaugurates a history. And this history recapitulates narratively a pre-history 
that was pre-narrative without presence, dialogical and semiotic (Adam’s naming animals) 
without reflective judgment or evaluations. This later development supposes a more 
substantive, figurable alterity to which an Ego could oppose itself. 
 Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy present their own version of this insight. “That the 
subject might be born [naisse] (rather than being constituted, or structured, in a word, posited 
for itself) means that it is deferred indefinitely. Moreover, the anxiety of this birth is also the 
phylogenetic event, or element, par excellence: if anxiety repeats, it is not through 
heredity…The community of [human] birth is the anxiety of the dissociation of identity” 
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(PJNRP, 65; 200). This deferral at the heart of the “birth” of the subject corresponds to a 
kind of social unfolding in which ethnic or tribal identity stands under a double question. In 
Moses’s case, the question is that of identification. For the Mosaic monotheistic tradition, 
identity is won through the return of repressed (latent and forgotten) material, in which 
election (ethical identification) and its refusal (in the murder of Moses) assure social 
identification and a distance from fusional identity. In the case of Buber’s Adam and Eve, 
the acquired supplement of knowledge from the Tree changes little about their condition. 
They do not come “to know” all things, because they cannot “know” as gods do, in the 
eternal now. That said, this supplement forces them and their progeny to reenact the 
condition (will to knowledge) as well as the nostalgia for an unconsciousness of it. All of this 
with more or less anxiety and awareness.  
 Conversely, the foreclosure—whether it takes the form of expulsion or the taboos 
on violence and the creation of pacts—inaugurates sociality within finitude rather than in the 
dream life of fusion with the eternal. According to Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy this is why 
the Jewish people “does not dream.” The vigil they preferred to the idea of phantasmatic 
identification resembles Buber’s vigil, which consists of listening to the voice in the biblical 
word, rather than representing or imbibing it. On the other hand, the return of the primeval 
father in “mass psychology” suggests that early identifications, even if temporarily 
neutralized by trauma (murder) and latency, persist to such an extent that when the son  
returns, he will return in some guise of the father. This complicates the trajectory of 
identification, emphasizing that foreclosure is never enduring.  
“If there was no such leader [among the colonized Jews], then Christ was the heir to 
an unfulfilled wish-fantasy; if there was such a leader, then the Christ was his successor and 
his reincarnation” (MAM, 111). Taken together, the foreclosure of dreaming and 
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identification, and the return of the repressed murder, suggest that no religion that follows 
Mosaic monotheism can be simply a “son-religion” (Ibid.). While Freud can say that Paul’s 
innovation consisted in reinstating the universality of Judaism, at the price of abolishing a 
restriction (called the Law!, MAM, 112), it remains that the repetition that took the form of 
Christianity created a contradiction. To obtain universality, that “one characteristic of the old 
Aton religion,” election and its sign (circumcision) had to be sublimated. If we read this with 
Freud’s observations on the Jewish Witz, that would suggest that Paul’s innovation did not 
leave Jewish sensibility unaffected. Election had long had an ethical signification, but election 
by an unreachable father held open the possibility of irony and necessitated the codification of 
practices through which identification was not magically obtained, but socially organized. 
Enter the paradoxical son, and election proceeds according to a “pneumatic” principle, 
justified by corporeal resurrection at the end of time. 
 Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy approached the difficulties of identification from the 
perspective of time and affectivity. For them, the foreclosure of dreaming gives rise to 
anxiety which, in Buber, would be a vigil. As they argue: “The affection [being-affected] that 
constitutes identity only takes place in the withdrawal of identity. [But] withdrawal does not 
mean absence, that is, a presence simply removed. No foregoing identity here can be 
removed. To withdraw is not to disappear and, properly speaking, it is no modality of being 
[et ce n’est à proprement parler aucun mode d’être].” What does this mean, if not to assert that 
“withdrawal is like an act of appearing, disappearing[?] Not only of appearing in 
disappearing, but of appearing as a disappearing, in the event of disappearing itself” (PJNRP 
66; 201). And that is precisely how anxiety repeats, like Alice in Wonderland’s Cheshire Cat 
and its appearing-disappearing grin.  
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 Identity is neither simply an intentional movement nor an affective vector. It is a real 
event without being one that is “objective”; that is, if to be an event means that something 
has “to be” as a thing or an entity. Our authors give it a term that is metaphoric in inception, 
but literal in operation: “inscription” (PJNRP, 66; 201). “Inscription” denotes traces left 
behind in some material. That it might be read or accessible to deciphering is not the 
primary condition of inscription. Inscription should instead be understood as the process of 
in-scribing, like the “writing” of trauma in or on a body that suffers and develops paralysis 
or anesthetic points. Here, what is “initial form” need never be repeated identically in order 
to recur. To be sure, there is a difference between the tragic irony of the expulsion and a 
traumatized body. However, both carry with them a yearning for wholeness and a resistance 
(to death, and to an inaugural event, whether creation or birth)—although this wholeness 
disappears under foreclosure. These paradoxical events suppose fragments of narratives even 
as they unravel when we take them up and examine their structure. Now, Buber’s 
interpretation of Genesis 3 was motivated by his vision of the renewal of Judaism.51 Freud’s 
reading of Moses both defends Jewish specificity and sets it into an open-ended 
“phylogenesis” of trauma, whose densest instance is the Jewish one. This is because, without 
promising salvation, it labors under the contradictory strains of a community of brothers, the 
struggle against the return of the primeval Father, and the ongoing discussion of what it 
means to set justice in the space left open by his disappearance (MAM, 116).52 Perhaps 
renewal is not a vindication, but both require a decisively historic sensibility. Consonant with 
the drive to incorporate knowledge of good and evil and to abjure mortality is the profound 
anxiety that accompanies the passage from dreaming to non-dreaming. Sometimes this 
anxiety engenders strategies for surpassing the trauma of an origin deferred. Although Paul 
resurrected the Father by transforming the Son into a son-father, messianic tendencies in 
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Judaism have opened onto other apostasies. Sabbataianism celebrated another such son-
father, whose paternal function was promulgated by his self-styled “prophet”, Nathan of 
Gaza.53 Buber’s concern to harness the forces for renewal (MAM, 118), which embrace 
ethical election while refusing identifications that include mimesis and incorporation 
(including the phantasy of incorporating the maternal breast, which precedes identification 
with the father), depend on narrative transmission (including a narrative “unconscious” that 
repeats itself silently in words). Yet this carries no historical assurance with it. The challenge 
lies in the recognition of the paradoxes of identity, and a symbolic order (stories, maxims, 
myths) apt to make possible the re-enactment, without fetishism, of social ties rooted in 
(deferred) identification.   
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well, “the Other does not know where I am”? The important point is the invisible, metaphoric ‘point’ 
created in this perplexing moment. For a short-lived instant, filled with anxiety, “that the Other might not 
know where I am provides the ego with the illusion of mastery by which he believes he is ‘there’ where he 
is hiding from the gaze.” Thus “the specular hiding place where Adam was concealed draws its consistency 
or solidity only from its disavowed unawareness: ‘It is because the Other does not know where I am that I 
can remain where I am hidden’.” But this is precisely what cannot continue, and the Other, who thus irrupts 
into what recent psychoanalysis calls the “real” (or is the “real”), makes it all too clear that I am not so 
much hidden as I simply no longer know where I am. This explains the anguish that God’s call produces in 
Adam. Les trois temps de la loi: Le commandement sidérant, l’injonction du surmoi et l’invocation 
musicale (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1995), pp. 200-202. 
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28 Tanakh, p. 6. 
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implication to be ashamed; also (by implication) to be disappointed or delayed—(be, or put to shame, be or 
cause to be confounded). Clearly, shame without the consciousness of fault or sin takes a meaning weaker 
than shame after the transgression. The present shame is closer to Levinas’s description.  
30 It was a reversal that humans, after expulsion, should strike at the serpent’s head—the seat of its 
“reason”—while all it could do was lunge at their feet. Where, after all, did the serpent first strike, if not at 
Eve’s imagination? 
31 What is radically original in the fact of being human is the way in which the human posits, before itself, 
the world in its autonomy. But we must add that: “to be-facing-the-world is not thinkable if there is not 
already a ‘behavior-towards-it-qua-world’, which is to say, the sketch of a relational behavior.” See Gabriel 
Marcel, “L’anthropologie philosophique de Martin Buber ” in Martin Buber : L’homme et le philosophe, 
Gabriel Marcel, Emmanuel Levinas et André Lacocque, Eds., (Brussels:  l’Université Libre de Bruxelles, 
1968), p. 26. The phrases in single quotes are from Buber’s “Schriften zur Philosophie ” in Werke, 
(Heidelberg: Kösel & Lambert Schneider Verlag, 1962), p. 414, my translation. Thanks to Gabriel 
Malenfant for this citation. 
32 As we know, Heidegger derives much of his insight into the Stimmung called Angst from Kierkegaard. 
Kierkegaard provides the first existentialist interpretation of the anxiety Adam felt in the Garden. This 
anxiety was due to his affective awareness that he ‘was able’. What precisely he was able to do was unclear 
to him, and thus produced anxiety. 
33 For Freud, writing between 1935 and 1936 (the unpublished third essay of his Moses and Monotheism), 
the emergence of the Third into consciousness, as separated and as omnipresent, could only have come to 
pass with a primordial transgression, like a murder. For Freud, influenced by Darwin and themes from 
Jung, the insistence of a species memory in human beings could erupt out of latency from time to time, 
much the way a neurosis erupts in an individual following a period of latency. This would be a trans-
cultural, trans-historic repetition scheme. If Moses was indeed the high priest of the monotheistic Egyptian 
monarch, Ikhnaton, and if he prolonged the survival of Egyptian monotheism by introducing the notion of 
being chosen as well as the foreclosures on mimetic representation we find in Judaism, then it could only 
be his murder (a murder that repeated a gesture dating from primeval times) that drove both his memory 
and the power of his teaching into latency. See Freud, Moses and Monotheism, Essay 3, “Moses, His 
People, and Monotheistic Religion” [written before March 1938], p. 102ff. For the discussion of prehistoric 
memory, repetition, and neurosis, see Ibid, pp. 107-115. The evidence for the murder of Moses, Freud finds 
in the work of Ernst Sellin, but also in Goethe’s Israel in der Wüste, vol. VII, cf. Moses, Op. cit., p. 114. 
34 Between 1894 and 1895, when he was still tied to neurology and a theory of energetics, Freud wrote the 
never-published Outline for a Scientific Psychology. There and in his work with Josef Breuer (Studies on 
Hysteria, 1895), he had encountered anxiety in such a variety of forms that he attempted to reduce it to a 
mechanistic model: anxiety signaled excesses produced by endogenous and exogenous stimuli, invariably 
seeking release through the musculature (in movement). As he developed his psychoanalysis, anxiety came 
to light as the primary symptom of the polymorphic neurosis that Freud had encountered in Charcot’s clinic 
at the Salpêtrière, “epileptoid hysteria”. In his first topos (i.e., primary and secondary processes), anxiety 
was the sign of repression and its energetic “price”. 
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that the psyche confronts approaches it from without (‘eine von aussen nahende…Gefahr’); but the 
‘excitation’ that constitutes the immediate form of that danger arises from within, endogenically’. The 
difficulty of reconciling these two assertions will be to explain just how the psyche can ‘notice’ (merkt) a 
danger that is both exogenic in origin and endogenic in operation.” 
41 A document by Freud that was only discovered in 1985, among Ferenczi’s papers, suggests that Freud 
was anything but sure about this order of priority. The document dates from 1915; it would therefore be a 
supplement to the arguments in Totem and Taboo (cf. Jean Laplanche, Nouveaux fondements pour la 
psychanalyse, (Paris: PUF, 1994), Chapt. 1. In English, New Foundations for Psychoanalysis, David 
Macey, trans., (New York: Blackwell Publishers, 1989). 
42 “All primeval men, including…all our ancestors, underwent the fate I shall now describe….The strong 
male was the master and father of the whole horde, unlimited in his power, which he used brutally. All 
females were his property…The fate of the sons was a hard one; if they excited the father’s jealousy, they 
were killed or castrated or driven out. They were forced to live in small communities and to provide 
themselves with wives by stealing them from others. Then one or the other son might succeed in attaining a 
situation similar to that of the father in the original horde” (MAM, 102-3).  
43 See Laplanche’s discussion of Freud as neither Lamarckian nor Darwinian; in Jean Laplanche, Loc. Cit. 
44 Buber understood this clearly. He recounts the story of Isaac, son of Yekel of Cracow who, because of a 
dream, travels to Prague to unearth a treasure. Once there, he encounters the captain of the guard who, for 
his part, had dreamed that he was to go to Cracow in order to find a treasure under the furnace of one Isaac, 
son of Yekel: “In that city, where half the Jews are called Isaac, and the other half, Yekel, I can see myself 
entering the houses, one after another, turning them upside down!” Buber casts irony on the one who would 
not listen to his dream, the more so that Isaac went home with enough treasure to rebuild the Shul. But this 
is not the “perfectly asocial” dream described by Freud in his study of the Witz. It is rather the “perhaps” of 
the dreamed message; the irony that, if one paid it heed, one might come off enriched. See Buber, Le 
chemin de l’homme d’après la doctrine hassidique (Der Weg des Menschen nach der chassidischen Lehre), 
Wolfgang Heumann, trans., (Monaco: du Rocher, 1989), pp. 49-56. 
45 Freud will write: “The restoration of the primeval father of his historical rights marked a great progress, 
but, the other parts the prehistoric tragedy also clamored for recognition. How this process was set in 
motion, it is not easy to say” (MAM, 109). Then, making a surprisingly Nietzschean inference, Freud adds: 
“It seems that a growing feeling of guiltiness had seized the Jewish people—and perhaps the whole 
civilization of that time—as a precursor of the return of the repressed material” (Ibid.). Note here that the 
original event is described as a tragedy. It is in the repetition that the tragedy is transformed, at least in the 
Jewish case. And it is transformed diversely: for Christians, into soteriology; for Muslims, a heroic 
monotheism; other religions remained closer to ancestor worship. The relationship between tragedy and 
irony is, clearly, over-determined. 
46 Freud, “Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety” in Standard Edition, (London: Hogarth Press, 1953-74), p. 
92.  
47 Weber, Op. cit., p. 91.  
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48 Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy argue that Freud, holding fast to a logic of identity—of the Ego that, 
however torn between the instances through which it takes shape in the second Topic, retains consistency 
as a subject—and to his entrenched “archeophilia” (attachment to a principle of origins), missed the quality 
of Jewish identity as a “path that would lead [him and us] beyond the identity principle” (195, my italics). 
They suggest that this explains “the failure, or at least…the suspension of the analysis of identification in 
Freud” (196)—a failure that went beyond his unease with Volkspsychologie. 
49 Weber, Op. cit., p. 96. 
50 Speaking of the totemic meal, or incorporation—which Freud insists is of the dead father—our authors 
venture: “But what is really dissociated, and incorporated, is a food that repeats the common maternal 
substance. Freud notes this…without seeing…that in its most “regressive”, most “internal” moment, in the 
moment of assimilation which brings the clan members together [repetitively]—and which dis-sociates 
them—the clan’s identification is an identification with the Mother.” While “at most we may speak of the 
maternal substance [here]”…[m]aternal unity is separation, expulsion. This primordial indivision is what it 
is—maternal—[ultimately] through division alone” (PJNRP, 67; 202).  
51 In a succinct study of his intellectual development, Pnina Levinson (Heidelberg) reminds us that, long 
emphasizing the difference between religiosity or faith, and religion, Buber was not concerned that biblical 
stories like this one were fables or myths, as such. The “demythification” popular among Christian 
theologians of his time (Bultmann) conferred no additional legitimacy to his Judaism. The Bible taught—
notably through the prophets, but also globally—the lesson of Teshuva: conversion, return to justice, and a 
new sense of what it means to be a Jew. Cf. P. N. Levinson, “Martin Buber: Sa vision du judaïsme dans la 
dialectique prêtre-prophète ” in Martin Buber : Dialogue et voix prophétique, Colloque international 
Martin Buber 30-31 octobre 1978 (Strasbourg : Centre de recherches et d’études hébraïques, Université des 
Sciences humaines de Strasbourg/ Paris : ISTINA, 1980), pp. 113ff.  
52 The question of justice is in fact tied to what the Jews did indeed admit, contrary to the Christian 
accusation of admitting no murder: i.e., the idea of castration, as sign, pact, and radical foreclosure. 
53 This was the centuries-long movement inaugurated by the life and “disappearance” of Sabbatai Tsvi, the 
17th century “messiah”. See Gershom Scholem’s immense study, Sabbatai Sevi: The Mystical Messiah 
(Princeton: Bollingen Press, 1976). 
